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1. Introduction 
Shocks from trade disputes and phytosanitary emergencies occasionally impact agricultural 
export markets. Affected exporters always hope that such events are short-lived. A trade dispute 
beginning in 2018 between the United States and China is a pertinent example that has led to 
additional tariffs on U.S. agricultural products including corn, soybeans, cotton, and pork 
(Marchant and Wang 2018). Notably, the price spread between U.S. and Brazilian soybean 
exports widened to a record-high immediately after tariffs were imposed by China around the 
middle of 2018, with the U.S. soybean export price remaining low relative to the Brazilian price 
throughout the rest of the year (Good 2018). By assuming the tariffs on U.S. agricultural goods 
remain in effect for the next 10 years, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA 2019) 
predicts that U.S. soybean exports would not return to pre-trade-war levels until 2028. However, 
even if the U.S. and China ended their disputes in 2019 or 2020 and the tariffs returned to pre-
2018 levels, the competitive structure of markets may have adjusted in the interim. U.S. farmers 
are rightly concerned that adverse effects of even short-lived disruptions could permanently alter 
market relationships as other exporters erode the U.S.’s share in global markets (Balistreri et al. 
2018; Elmer 2019; Hirtzer 2019). In particular, once China finds new trading partners, 
renegotiation costs can slow the U.S. in regaining market share just as it did for U.S. grain 
markets following the short-lived 1980 U.S. embargo of the former Soviet Union (Balistreri et al 
2018).  
In this paper, we shed light on how long it takes an export market to recover from a trade 
disruption. Although at this writing, the current U.S. and China trade disruptions are making 
headlines, it is difficult to forecast long-run outcomes for something that has limited data. We 
simply do not know the extent to which the disputes are permanently changing export 
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relationships.  The outbreak of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), also known as mad 
cow disease, in December 2003 in the United States provides an imperfect yet insightful case 
study.  At the time of the outbreak, it was unclear what the long-run implications to U.S. beef 
might be.  From January 2004 through approximately April 2007, U.S. beef trade with many 
countries vanished, was restricted, or was intermittent (USDA-FAS 2019). Using longitudinal 
data on beef export values, we study the long-run impacts of BSE on U.S. beef export 
competitiveness, construct the hypothetical scenario of no BSE event in 2003, and then predict 
what competitiveness might have looked like for the U.S. beef sector. 
We create an empirical proxy to measure country-level beef industry comparative 
advantage over time: the indicator for competitiveness in our study. We show that while the U.S. 
beef export values has mostly recovered back to their pre-BSE levels, the U.S.’s comparative 
advantage has yet to return to where it was prior to the BSE outbreak. We jointly estimate the 
effect of the BSE outbreak on the comparative advantages of other major exporters. We find that 
in the absence of the 2003 U.S. BSE event, the U.S. would have kept its comparative advantage 
in beef; moreover, its competitiveness would have grown over time. The results indicate 
significant lingering impacts of BSE on U.S. beef competitiveness that are less obvious when 
examining export values alone.  
 This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we construct a 
modified revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index proposed by Yu et al. (2009) to present 
the trends of comparative advantage of the U.S. beef industry and other major competitors from 
year to year. The RCA index was first proposed by Balassa (1977) and reformulated in Balassa 
(1986), and is used frequently when looking for changes in a country’s trade status (Gortan et al. 
2000; Ferto and Hunnard 2003). However, the original RCA index features unsatisfactory 
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characteristics that are not appropriate to be used in statistical analyses (Vollrath 1991; Hoen and 
Oosterhaven 2006; Yu et al. 2009; Laursen 2015). The reformulated RCA index developed and 
used by Yu et al. (2009) resolves these limitations. To the best of our knowledge, we are not 
aware of any studies that have used an RCA index to study the impact of BSE on the U.S.’s beef 
sector competitiveness. 
 Different aspects of the adverse economic impacts of BSE outbreaks have been studied 
both in the U.S. and other countries. Research finds negative impacts on consumer demand for 
beef products in the aftermath of local BSE events (e.g., Burton and Young 1996; Mangen and 
Burrell 2001; Verbeke and Ward 2001; Peterson and Chen 2005). Other studies have examined 
the effects of food scares from BSE outbreaks on cattle futures prices and beef sales adjustments 
finding evidence of significant structural breaks of futures prices and adverse effects on beef 
sales following BSE events (Jin et al. 2008; Marsh et al. 2008; Schlenker and Villas-Boas 2009; 
Taha and Hahn 2014). We add to this literature by providing evidence of the impact of an 
outbreak of BSE on a country’s international competitiveness. The aforementioned studies tend 
to focus on the short-run impacts of BSE, our results highlight the significance of long-run 
impacts on a country’s trade performance.   
 This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide background information on the 
U.S. beef sector’s competitiveness in the world market, as well as a brief history of the BSE 
outbreak in the United States. Section 3 describes the data construction process and presents 
summary statistics. Section 4 lays out the empirical analyses and discusses results. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes and discusses future research. 
2. Background 
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United States Beef Export Competitiveness 
The U.S. beef industry operates in a highly competitive global marketplace. Major competitors 
include Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, and Mexico (USDA-FAS 2019). Historically, 
the United States has held a comparative advantage in beef production due to a well-developed 
infrastructure and a reputation for both meat quality and food safety. However, the United States 
can be at a disadvantage relative to cost of production. For example, a pound of grass-fed beef 
can typically be produced at lower cost, where the majority of U.S. beef is grain-fed. 
Competitive advantages can also be built around the sophisticated use of information. Globally, 
animal identification and traceability are important components of managing animal and human 
health and food safety (Schroeder and Tonsor 2012). Traceability systems also enhance 
communication and coordination by delivering information up and down the supply chain to 
benefit producers, processors, and consumers. Smith et al. (2005) reported that the United States 
is “lagging behind many countries in developing traceability systems for food in general and 
especially for livestock, and their products” (p. 174). Of the world’s eight largest exporters, six 
have in place mandatory cattle animal identification and traceability systems. Only the United 
States and India have not adopted mandatory national identification and traceability systems 
(Schroeder and Tonsor 2012). In short, the United States’ beef industry today faces a highly 
competitive and developing global market place (Murphy et al. 2009; Schroeder and Tonsor 
2012; Pendell et al. 2013). Trade relationships, exchange rates, and economic growth rates in 
other countries all affect the export demand profile.  
2003 U.S. BSE Outbreak 
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is a neurological disorder of cattle that cannot yet be 
treated or vaccinated against. Cattle affected by BSE experience degeneration of the nervous 
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system. BSE can be categorized into two types — classical (C-type) and atypical (H-type or L-
type). Only the classical BSE is zoonotic, where humans can become infected through 
consumption of diseased beef products, but symptoms do not appear for some time, making 
diagnosis, and hence food recalls, more difficult.1 The disease became officially recognized in 
the 1980s, and the first diagnosis of classical BSE was reported in the United Kingdom in 1986, 
spreading throughout the country and lasting for almost a decade. Thousands of classical BSE 
cases were reported during this period, raising public health concerns across the world.  
The first case of classical BSE confirmed in North America was in Alberta, Canada in 
May 2003. In December 2003 a cow in Washington State also tested positive for C-type BSE. 
Immediately, import bans against U.S. (and Canadian) beef products arose. Most markets, 
including Japan and South Korea, who were major buyers of U.S. beef at the time, did not re-
open their markets until after 2006. Since then, the United States has strengthened regulations on 
imports of feeds by following the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) guidelines, as 
well as increased traceability of cattle travelling across state borders. There have only been five 
cases of BSE confirmed in the U.S. since the 2003 discovery in Washington State; all diagnosed 
as atypical BSE and did not lead to trade issues.2 In fact, in 2013 the U.S. BSE-status was 
upgraded to negligible risk by the OIE. In 2015, the OIE excluded atypical BSE forms from the 
classical BSE general risk provisions.   
3. Data  
                                                            
1 See more discussion at https://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_health/fs-bse.pdf. 
2 The five cases reported were in the following states: Texas, Alabama, California, and Florida.  
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This study examines the 12 largest beef exporters since the 1980s. For each country, we collect 
annual data on beef (SITC: Meat of bovine animals, fresh, chilled or frozen) export value as well 
as total (SITC: All commodities) export value (both in USD) from the UN Comtrade database 
from 1980 to 2018. We employ linear interpolation to replace three missing observations by 
calculating the simple average of previous-year and next-year observations in order to have a 
balanced dataset.3 Figure 1 displays beef export values of the 12 countries over the sample 
period. As shown, U.S. beef export value experienced a sharp decline immediately after the BSE 
outbreak in 2003, followed by a quick recover since around 2006, and restored its pre-BSE level 
around 2010. Meanwhile, major competitors all seem to have absorbed the lost market share 
from the U.S. to different degrees. Notably, Australia and Brazil surpassed the U.S. in export 
value after the BSE outbreak. In fact, the U.S. did not regain its lead measured by export value 
until 2017. It is worth noting that while India has also become one of the largest beef exporters, 
particularly since the late 2000s, its growth was not due to the 2003 U.S. BSE outbreak, as India 
beef, composed of almost 50 percent water buffalo, arguably serves a different from clientele 
than that of the major competitors (Landes et al. 2016; Aradhey 2019).  
[Insert Figure 1: Annual Beef Export Values (Billion USD)] 
 Basic summary statistics and the sources of all the data used in the analysis are placed in 
the appendix. We collect data on cattle stock and cattle slaughtered, as they contribute to beef 
production and its export market share. Cattle stock and cattle slaughtered are measured in heads. 
To allow for comparison of cattle production across countries, we further construct a cattle 
                                                            
3 No reasons are mentioned in the data source for the three missing observations. These are Nicaragua in 1987, 
Panama in 1987, and Paraguay in 1981. We choose to do simple linear interpolation because only three observations 
out of 444 are missing. An alternative is to predict the missing values by regressing each country’s trade value on 
variables that can explain variation in trade values.   
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stock-to-slaughter ratio. Exchange rates affect the relative prices of beef exports. Given that the 
exports are not bilateral, we choose the national currency per SDR (special drawing rights) as the 
preferred indicator.4  
Ideally, we would also like to control for other sources of cattle production costs. 
Because not all exporters in our analysis have available producer prices, we instead use the 
inflation rate of local consumer prices, as the rate of change between consumer and producer 
prices tend to be similar.5 Corn futures prices are used as a proxy for feed costs. For the United 
States, we also include meat slaughtering labor cost to better proxy for the cost of beef 
production. Such data are not available for the other countries. To capture any underlying 
technological progress that could also contribute to the change in a country’s comparative 
advantage in beef, we include a linear trend variable. We control for nonlinearities in the 
following manner.  The main interest of the study is to estimate the long-run effect of the BSE 
outbreak on comparative advantage. Hence, to examine any possible nonlinear impact over time, 
we generate nonlinear trend variables using the restricted cubic spline function, instead of 
generating a simple dummy variable indicating the BSE event.6 We do so by interacting 
nonlinear trend variables, generated using STATA’s mkspline command, with the BSE dummy 
variable.   The five knots are generated at years 1983, 1991, 2000, 2009, and 2016. Given only 
post-BSE periods are fitted with nonlinear trend variables, only two knots (2009 and 2016) are 
used. 
                                                            
4 The value of SDR is determined by a basket of currencies, including the British pound sterling, the Chinese 
renminbi, the euro, the Japanese yen, and the U.S. dollar. 
5 Consumer prices for all 12 countries are collected from the World Bank. Data for Argentina is missing after 2013. 
We fill its missing values from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
6 See https://www.stata.com/manuals13/rmkspline.pdf for the discussion of the underlying generating process. 
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4. Empirical Analyses 
Revealed Comparative Advantage in the Beef Sector 
To examine whether the U.S. has held a comparative advantage in beef exports, we construct 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indices for the U.S. as well as for eleven other major 
beef exporting countries. The RCA index was first proposed by Balassa (1977) and reformulated 
in Balassa (1986) as an empirical proxy for Ricardian comparative advantage. While useful, 
Balassa’s original RCA index features some unsatisfactory characteristics. In particular, the 
index only indicates whether the country itself has a comparative advantage in a specific 
product/sector, but it does not hold either cardinal or ordinal properties. Therefore, one cannot 
compare Balassa’s indices across countries or over time. Following recent literature, we adopt 
the normalized revealed comparative advantage (NRCA) index proposed by Yu et al. (2009)7. 
The NRCA index allows for symmetry and comparability, facilitating its use in an examination 
of changes to international competitiveness. For a country 𝑖𝑖 exporting good 𝑗𝑗 (beef in our 
analysis), the NRCA index is defined as 
(1) 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝐸𝐸 � �𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 − 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸 �,  
where 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is country 𝑖𝑖’s export of good 𝑗𝑗, 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is country 𝑖𝑖’s total export of all commodities, 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is 
world’s export of good 𝑗𝑗, and 𝐸𝐸 is world’s total export of all commodities. Under this 
formulation, a country has a comparative advantage in beef (i.e., 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 0) if it enjoys a larger 
beef export market share than that of total commodities, and does not have a comparative 
                                                            
7 See Sarker and Ratnasena (2014) for in depth discussion of the development of new RCA indices. Sarker and 
Ratnasena (2014) also adopt the modified RCA index by Yu et al. (2009) in their analysis on Canadian beef 
comparative advantage.  
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advantage if otherwise (i.e., 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 < 0).8 Figure 2 shows each country’s NRCA in beef exports 
over the sample period. 
[Insert Figure 2: Normalized Revealed Comparative Advantage] 
 Australia has a lower beef production cost and indeed, we see that Australia has been 
leading other competitors in comparative advantage. The U.S. had been enjoying an increasingly 
strong share in the beef export market relative to its total exports since the 1980s, and started to 
have a comparative advantage after the 1990s until the discovery of BSE in December 2003. 
Like the impact on beef export values, trade bans on U.S. beef resulted in an adverse shock to its 
competitiveness, where the U.S. NRCA in beef fell to levels last seen in the late 1980s. What 
figure 2 also shows is that no single country completely snatched the lost U.S. market 
advantages. Instead, U.S. competitiveness appears to have been re-distributed to a handful of 
other exporters. This graphical evidence suggests that the market moved toward higher 
competitiveness all-around.9 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SURs) Estimation 
We next move to estimating the impacts of the BSE outbreak on the U.S. and other countries’ 
comparative advantage in beef. We limit the sample period to cover 1981 to 2017,ending just 
prior to the U.S. engagement on trade renegotiations. We correlate the NRCA index with 
variables we consider would contribute to its variation. Because the NRCA index is constructed 
using exports to all importing countries instead of bilateral exports, we can view these exporters 
                                                            
8 NRCA indices are relatively small (in absolute value) because of the normalization, which is driven by the term 
𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗
𝐸𝐸
 
(i.e., because beef products only account for a small share of total commodities in the global market).   
9 We note that our observation of relatively stable comparative advantage in beef for Australia and New Zealand, 
especially in the late 2010s, is consistent with Sanderson and Ahmadi-Esfahani (2011), who model the long-run 
impacts of climate change on countries’ comparative advantage in the livestock industry. 
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as serving the world market together. As a result, we estimate the twelve equations 
simultaneously as a seemingly unrelated regression system, with potentially correlated, cross-
equations errors. The system of equations is specified in equation (2): 
(2) 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖1𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖2𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖3𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖iy + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖4𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +                                    𝛽𝛽5𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟_𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖6𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖7𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖8𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖 +                                    𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖9𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑐𝑐3𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖10𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑐𝑐4𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
Consistent with equation (1), 𝑖𝑖 denotes country, and 𝑦𝑦 denotes year. For each country (ignoring 
subscripts), 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖o is the cattle stock-to-slaughter ratio,10 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛 is the corn futures price, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 
is the inflation rate for consumer prices, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟_𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 is the meat slaughtering labor cost that 
only appears in the U.S. equation. 𝑐𝑐1 is a linear trend variable. 𝑐𝑐2, 𝑐𝑐3, and 𝑐𝑐4 are nonlinear trend 
variables generated using the restricted cubic spline function, which along with the linear trend 
variable, are interacted with the BSE dummy variable that equals zero prior to 2003, and one 
afterwards.  
 One concern with equation (2) is that while 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 contributes to the variation of 
NRCA, it is also likely a channel through which the BSE outbreak impacts a country’s NRCA in 
beef. For instance, the U.S. may decrease its cattle slaughter rate in response to import bans from 
other countries after the BSE outbreak. This suggests that the effect of the BSE outbreak on 
NRCA can be biased towards statistical insignificance once 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 is held constant in the 
regression. In the extreme case, if one believes that 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 is the only channel through 
which the BSE outbreak impacts NRCA, then one would erroneously conclude that there is no 
correlation between the BSE outbreak and beef export competitiveness from the regression result 
                                                            
10 We prefer the cattle stock-to-slaughter ratio to two separate variables of cattle stock and cattle slaughter in the 
equation to avoid potential high collinearity between the two variables. The correlation coefficients between cattle 
stock and cattle slaughtered for most countries are above 0.7. 
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after controlling for 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜. To address this issue, we implement a first-stage regression of 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 on the post-BSE trend variables and obtain the predicted error term for each 
country: 
(3) 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖0 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖1𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖2𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖3𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑐𝑐3𝑖𝑖 +                                                𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖4𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑐𝑐4𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
By construction, the predicted error term ϵ𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦�, which we interpret as the residual variation of 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜, is not correlated with the post-BSE trend variables. Therefore, we replace 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 with ϵ𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦� in equation (2) to estimate the following system of equations:11  
(4) 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖1𝜖𝜖?̂?𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖2𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖3cpiiy + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖4𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼5𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟_𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖6𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖 +                                    𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖7𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖8𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖9𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑐𝑐3𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖10𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑐𝑐4𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,  
where all variables are the same as in equation (2), except for ϵ𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦�, the residual variation of 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜.  
To aid in discussion, we standardize the NRCA indices in equation (4), thus the 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients will be how many standard deviations of change in 
NRCA given a unit change in a given right-hand-side variable. The results of interest are the 
predicted values of NRCA from the regression model. Once equation (4) is estimated, we obtain 
the predicted NRCA indices for all countries. We also predict the NRCA indices under the 
counterfactual scenario of no BSE outbreak in 2003 by replacing the BSE dummy variable with 
zero values in the post-BSE periods to study the impacts of the BSE outbreak.  
Estimation Results 
                                                            
11 We also present the result of using the unaltered cattle stock-to-slaughter ratio in the appendix. 
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For the sake of brevity, although the system of equations is for the top 12 beef exporting nations, 
the discussion of findings will focus on the U.S. as well as the top five exporters: Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and New Zealand. Table 1 present the estimation of the SUR models for 
all 12 countries.12  
[Insert Table 1: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions] 
 Given that there are 37 observations in each equation, we adopt the small sample 
adjustment when performing the estimation.13 In most cases, the coefficients of variables related 
to cost of production are not statistically significant, except for the meat slaughtering house labor 
cost in the U.S. equation. Still, the regression model fits the variation of our NRCA indices well 
based on the R-square values for the top five exporting countries, suggesting the variation is 
mostly explained by the trend variables that capture other unobserved underlying changes in 
factors contributing to comparative advantage14.  
 Next we turn to the presentation of the predicted NRCA indices over time from the SUR 
estimations as shown in Figure 315. Our model predicts that not only would the U.S. would have 
continued having comparative advantage (i.e., NRCA > 0) in beef after 2003, but it would have 
steadily increased in the absence of the BSE event. In actuality, the U.S. today is only as 
competitive as it was twenty years ago. A simple test of the model is that a similar story is 
observed for Canada, who was also impacted by a BSE outbreak in 2002.16  
                                                            
12 The estimated results of equation (3) are presented in the appendix. 
13 Instead of the number of sample observations 𝑛𝑛, the alternate divisor used to compute the covariance matrix takes 
the form �(𝑛𝑛 − 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖)�𝑛𝑛 − 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖�, where 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 and 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 are the numbers of parameters in equation 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗.  
14 R2 values for the top five exporters are around 90%, and lower for Mexico at around 60%.  
15 Figures of the prediction results for the six other countries are presented in the appendix. 
16 Canada, while also hit by BSE and whose NRCA has been trending downward since, did not experience a sharp 
decline as the United States did. This is likely due to the availability of a traceability program in Canada that was not 
available in the United States. 
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On the other hand, we observe that Australia, Brazil, and New Zealand would have 
shown a decreasing trend in their comparative advantage in beef without the 2003 BSE outbreak 
and these three countries were all on track to lose their comparative advantage (i.e., NRCA < 0) 
in beef over time. Mexico’s NRCA would have displayed little change had there been no BSE 
outbreak. This is likely because Mexico, similar to India, has not been directly competing with 
Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. in the large import markets of Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan.  
[Insert Figure 3: Predicted NRCA — BSE vs. no-BSE] 
5. Conclusions 
As trade disruptions made headlines in 2018 and 2019, one concern has been the long-run 
impacts to export competitiveness. Such impacts are difficult to ascertain until more data become 
available. Phytosanitary emergencies can provide insight into these potential impacts because 
they cause disruptions that are often expected to be short-lived, similar to trade disputes. What 
we see however is that even a short-term market closure can lead to long-term consequences to 
market structure that lingers beyond the phytosanitary event’s conclusion.  Trade negotiators 
who drag their feet can hurt the long-run competitiveness of their own country. In this study, we 
provide evidence of the effect of the 2003 BSE outbreak in the U.S. on global beef export 
competitiveness. We first show that the comparative advantage of the U.S. beef sector in the 
world market was significantly impacted by the BSE outbreak of 2003, but while export values 
eventually returned to pre-outbreak levels, comparative advantage has not. The international beef 
market has become more competitive since the outbreak. We also predict comparative 
advantages under the counterfactual scenario of no-BSE event. Our results show that in the 
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absence of the BSE outbreak, the U.S. beef sector would have been increasingly more 
competitive by 2017 than it actually was. 
 A criticism of our approach might be in the use of the SUR model instead of relying on a 
natural experiment. After all, only the U.S. and Canada were impacted directly with BSE in 2002 
and 2003, which might lend itself to a comparison of impacted versus non-impacted exporters.  
Recent developments in the causal inference literature, for example, might provide alternative 
methods that seem to fit this settings. Abadie et al. (2010) propose a synthetic control method 
that is commonly used to estimate treatment effects where the treatment is at the aggregate level, 
and there is only a single treated unit (e.g., a country). The advantage of this method is, instead 
of extrapolating the data to predict the no-BSE scenario (i.e., replacing the BSE dummy variable 
with zero values after 2003), we might directly estimate the counterfactual scenario using other 
countries that we argue were not impacted by the BSE outbreak as the control units. However, 
such methods are problematic given that competing countries will pick up the lost U.S. market 
share. In other words, natural experiments are biased because–in this case–spillover effects of the 
BSE event invalidate the experiment: there is no control group. SUR controls for correlated error 
terms, on the other hand. 
Another criticism of our method might be in misinterpreting why the U.S. (and Canada) 
suffered for such a long time from the BSE outbreak. It could be that consumers changed their 
preferences for U.S. beef, something for which our model does not account.  This is possible, 
however, Marsh et al. (2008) studied this issue precisely and conclude that the impacts of BSE 
on demand come from the trade bans, not from changes in consumer preferences.  
Research studying the potential impacts of the China-U.S. trade disputes (2018-19) is 
important but are limited to descriptive analyses or simulation studies for which changes to 
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market structure (e.g. equilibrium displacement) can only be guessed in the short-run (Marchant 
and Wang 2018; Balistreri et al. 2018). As more data become available, these studies take on 
greater information.  Even with its “comparing apples to oranges” limitations, the lesson from 
our BSE case study has an important implication.  Markets disrupted do not easily bounce back 
after the disruption. Using longitudinal data on beef exports that spans before and after the 2003 
BSE event, we directly observe longer impacts of a significant, albeit arguably short-lived, trade 
interruption and show that a country’s export competitiveness can take a long time to recover, if 
at all. 
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Figures and Tables  
 
 
Figure 1: Annual Beef Export Values (Billion USD) 
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Figure 2: Normalized Revealed Comparative Advantage 
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 Table 1: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
1-1: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, and Mexico 
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 Table 1: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. (Continued.) 
1-2: New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, United States, and Uruguay 
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Figure 3: Predicted NRCA — BSE v.s. no-BSE 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Summary Statistics  
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Table A1: Summary Statistics (Continued) 
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Table A2: First-Stage Regressions 
A2-1: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, and Mexico 
 
 
A2-2: New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, United States, and Uruguay 
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Figure A1: Predicted NRCA — BSE v.s. no-BSE (Six Other Countries) 
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Table A3: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (Unaltered Cattle Ratio) 
A3-1: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, and Mexico 
 
 
 
31 
 
A3-2: New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, United States, and Uruguay 
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Figure A2: Predicted NRCA with unaltered cattle ratio — BSE v.s. no-BSE 
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Figure A2: Predicted NRCA with unaltered cattle ratio — BSE v.s. no-BSE (Continued) 
 
 
